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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether altruistic punishment when cooperation norms are violated is 
sensitive to gender effects. Our framework is a one-shot social dilemma game with third-
party punishment in which subjects are informed of the others’ gender within their group. 
This allows us to test whether third-party punishment depends on the punisher’s as well as on 
the contributors’ gender. We include treatments where the contributors have either the same 
or different gender from that of the third-party punishers. Our findings indicate that the 
assignment of altruistic punishment is gender sensitive. While third-party punishment is 
assigned similarly when contributors have the same gender as third-party punishers, this is 
not the case when the gender of the contributors and third-party punishers is different. Third-
party male punishers sanction significantly harsher female contributors and earn significantly 
less relative to third-party female punishers when matched with male contributors. Overall, 
our results have important implications for the design of teams in the presence of free-riding 
incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
Punishment plays a central role in regulating self-interested behaviour and sustaining societal 
stability when strong free-riding incentives are present. Recent experimental research has 
shown that punishment is of critical importance for the enforcement of social norms even 
when it is meted out by impartial third-party observers who are not materially affected by the 
decisions of norm violators (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Leibbrandt and López-Pérez, 
2012; Tan and Xiao, 2012; 2014). Yet, we still know little about the determinants that shape 
the content of third-party sanctioning. Existing evidence demonstrates that the willingness of 
individuals to assign third-party punishment depends on factors such as social distance 
(Bernhard et al., 2006), observability of punishment (Kurzban et al., 2007) and age 
(Lergetporer et al., 2014). The literature, however, remains silent about whether third-party 
punishment is sensitive to gender disparities. This is surprising given that past experimental 
studies have recognised the role of gender as one fundamental factor that influences several 
facets of economic behaviour (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009). For example, prominent 
gender differences have been uncovered when preferences over competition are elicited. As 
surveyed in Niederle and Vesterlund (2011), typical findings from this literature are that 
women tend to shy away from competition with men and underperform when competing 
against men. More related to our study, previous research has investigated the presence of 
gender effects in relation to altruistic and cooperative behaviour, with the literature producing 
mixed results (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, 2001; Balliet et al., 2011). As Niederle (2015, pp. 523) points out, the vast 
majority of papers on gender differences fall into a somewhat narrow band of games (mainly 
dictator and public good games). 
The overarching objective of our paper is to broaden the existing literature by 
identifying the pure effects of gender differences on monetary third-party punishment when 
cooperation norms are violated. The related literature is very scant
1
 and we are aware of no 
other study which is specifically designed to test for gender effects in social dilemma games 
with third-party punishment. There are only a few relevant studies which report gender data 
                                                          
1
 In Niederle’s (2015, ch. 8) comprehensive review on gender effects, there appears to be lack of evidence in the 
literature with regards to whether the assignment of punishment is a function of gender. There is only a mention 
in a paper by Gaechter and Poen (2013) who analyse data from 17 papers on social dilemma games without and 
with second-party punishment. They report significant gender differences in cooperative behaviour in the sense 
that men contribute significantly more than women in a public good game with punishment in societies where 
mostly free-riders are punished. However, no specific reference to how gender affects the assignment of 
punishment is made. Additionally, the experiments included in the Gaechter and Poen (2013) paper is related to 
second-party punishment social dilemma games, whereby players’ contribution decisions materially affect the 
punishers’ earnings. 
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as part of their analysis. Using a series of third-party punishment allocation games, 
Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2012) find that women punish socially efficient choices 
significantly more than men do. Carpenter and Matthews (2012) report results from 
regression analyses showing than women are more committed to norm enforcement (using 
different definitions of the contribution norm). In a field experiment, Balafoutas and 
Nikiforakis (2012) show that compared to males, females have a much lower willingness to 
assign non-monetary third-party punishment (as measured by disapproval expression towards 
norm violations such as littering and queue cutting). Taken together, the existing evidence 
suggests that gender seems to be a crucial factor in determining third-party sanctioning and 
provides us with motivation to study more systematically the impact of gender on third-party 
punishment in social dilemma games. 
Since our main concern is with gender differences, we decided to inform subjects 
about their counterpart’s gender in a group. Our choice is motivated by numerous real-life 
environments in which individual characteristics, and especially gender, can naturally be 
identified in social interactions. For example, in teamwork environments, the monitoring 
authority (which can take the form of an employer or a supervisor in a firm) can easily find 
out whether the other members in the group are men or women. In laboratory experiments, 
however, interactions among subjects frequently take place without providing information 
about others’ individual characteristics. This abstracts from what is often observed in many 
naturally-occurring environments in which individual characteristics, and in particular gender 
identity, become salient. By providing information about the gender of the other members in 
a group, our setting conforms to real-world interactions and also allows us to draw causal 
conclusions about whether monetary third-party punishment depends on the punisher’s as 
well as on the contributors’ gender, which also has not been addressed by previous studies. 
We are specifically interested in how third-party males and females mete out costly 
punishment when cooperation norms are violated. The reason for this is that the ability to 
enforce social norms is one of the distinguishing features of human societies (see Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004) and it is therefore important to shed more light on the forces determining 
the content of acceptable standards of behaviour in such environments. In particular, gaining 
a better understanding of the role of gender has important implications for the design of 
institutions that promote cooperation when strong free-riding incentives are present. We 
analyse one-shot interactions which enable us to assess the gender content of third-party 
punishment when strategic motives are ruled out. Our framework consists of a three-player 
social dilemma game with third-party punishment. Specifically, two members in a group have 
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to decide whether and if so, how much to contribute to the common resource. The parameters 
are chosen such that not contributing maximises individual earnings, whereas joint earnings 
are maximised when both members in a group contribute fully. Their contribution decisions 
have no material influence on the earnings of the third-party punisher, who acts in the role of 
an uninvolved bystander. More specifically, after contributions have been made, the third-
party punisher observes the profile of contributions of each group member and has to decide 
whether and if so, how much to sanction them. The third party-punishers can reduce their 
own as well as the contributors’ earnings but is unaffected from the contributors’ decisions. 
Our experiment employs a between-subjects design, consisting of four treatments in 
which the gender of the contributors and that of the third-party punishers can either be the 
same or different. This implies that third-party male (female) punishers are matched with 
either male or female contributors, depending on the treatment. Our main findings indicate 
that in groups where the gender of all subjects is the same, third-party male and female 
punishers sanction similarly. However, third-party punishment is sensitive to gender effects 
when the gender of the contributors is different from that of the third-party punisher. In 
particular, we find that third-party male punishers sanction significantly harsher female 
contributors compared to the punishment assigned by third-party female punishers towards 
male contributors, ceteris paribus. As a result, third-party male punishers earn significantly 
less when matched with female contributors compared to third-party female punishers when 
matched with male contributors. Our results have implications about the importance of 
gender composition in team settings characterised by strong free-riding incentives and 
highlight the gender perspective that needs to be considered when the assignment of roles 
within teams in the workplace and elsewhere is determined. 
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental design and 
procedures. Section 3 presents the experimental results. Section 4 discusses our findings and 
concludes. 
 
2. Laboratory experiment with third-party punishment 
2.1 Framework 
We conduct an experiment which is specifically designed to shed light on how gender affects 
strong negative reciprocity, as measured in a one-shot third party game with punishment. For 
this purpose, we adopt the framework developed by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). In 
particular, subjects participate in a two-stage game. At the beginning of the experiment, 
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subjects are divided into groups of three. In the first stage, two members in the group (to 
which we refer as “contributors”) are each endowed with 10 tokens and have to decide 
(simultaneously and independently) whether and if so, how much to contribute to the public 
good (described to subjects as “project”). Each token a group member keeps in her/his own 
private account yields a return of 1 ECU to that group member. Each token invested in the 
group project yields a return of 1.5 ECUs to the group, which is equally divided between the 
two group members (meaning that the marginal per capita return is equal to 0.75). 
After contribution decisions from the first stage have been made, the third group 
member (to which we refer as the “third party punisher”) is informed of the contributions’ 
profile of each of the other two group members and is given the opportunity to sanction them 
by assigning negative points. Specifically, the third-party punisher, who is not materially 
affected by the contributions of other two members in her/his group, is endowed with 20 
tokens and can assign between 0 and 10 negative points to each other two group members. 
Assigning negative points is costly both for the punisher and the recipient of the punishment. 
We used a cost-to-impact which is equal to 1:3. This means that each punishment point costs 
the third party punisher 1 ECU and the recipient of the punishment 3 ECUs. 
 
2.2 Experimental design 
Since we are interested in measuring the effects of gender on altruistic punishment, in all our 
treatments subjects were informed of the gender of the other members in their group. We 
vary whether the third-party punisher has the same or different gender with that of the other 
two “contributors” (depending on the treatment), while keeping the gender of the two 
contributors always the same within a group. Thus, our experimental design consists of four 
treatments: (1) “All Males” in which both contributors and third party punisher in a group are 
males; (2) “All Females” in which both contributors and third party punisher in a group are 
females; (3) “Two Males – One Female” in which both contributors are males and the third 
party punisher is a female; and (4) “Two Females – One Male” in which both contributors are 
females and the third party punisher is a male. Table 1 summarises our experimental 
treatments.
2
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 Note that we are concerned with how punishment behaviour is affected when subjects are aware of their 
counterparts’ gender as typically happens in many real-life instances. Thus, we do not include a treatment in 
which subjects are not informed as this would introduce an additional confound (namely, knowing or not 
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Table 1. Summary of experimental treatments 
  Third-party punisher’s gender 
 
 
Contributors’ 
gender 
 Male Female 
Males All Males Two Males – 
One Female 
Females Two Females – 
One Male 
All Females 
 
Our design allows evaluating the causal effect that gender composition of a group has 
on altruistic punishment as measured by observing the sanctioning behaviour of the third-
party punisher towards the contributors. In particular, we are able to understand whether 
third-party males and females punishers are more or less willing to assign harsher punishment 
for violations of cooperation norms, when the gender group composition of the contributors is 
the same or different from the gender of the punishers. 
Beliefs’ elicitation: While the contributors were deciding about their own contribution 
decisions, we asked third-party punishers to indicate how much they expected the 
contributors to contribute to the public good, on average. We did not want the belief 
elicitation to interfere with the incentive structure of the social dilemma game by creating 
income effects and opted to not pay for correct beliefs. We also wanted to avoid third-party 
punishment being motivated by disappointment about low payoffs resulting from inaccurate 
beliefs. 
 
2.3 Procedures 
In total, 306 subjects participated in the experiment. Table 1 presents an overview of our 
treatments, along with a breakdown of the number of subjects who participated in each 
treatment separately. 
Table 2. Overview of the experimental design 
Treatments No. of subjects 
All Males 75 
All Females 87 
Two Males – One Female 72 
Two Females – One Male 72 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
knowing the others’ gender) which would convolute identifying the pure effects of gender on third-party 
punishment behaviour. 
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All subjects were recruited at the University of Birmingham, using the ORSEE 
software (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was computerized and programmed with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of each session, subjects were privately paid 
according to their total amount of experimental currency units (ECUs), using an exchange 
rate of £0.40 per ECU. Average earnings (excluding a show-up fee of £2.50) were £8.16. 
Sessions lasted 50 minutes, on average. Before subjects played the game, they received the 
instructions reproduced in the Appendix. As we wanted to ensure that subjects understood the 
decision situation and the mechanics of payoff calculations, all participants answered several 
control questions. The experiment did not proceed until every subject had answered these 
questions correctly. 
 
3. Experimental results 
In presenting our experimental results, we first report how subjects behaved in terms of 
contribution across treatments. Following this, we present our results on third-party 
punishment behaviour, which addresses our main research question of whether and if so, how 
altruistic punishment is sensitive to gender effects. 
 
3.1 Contribution behaviour 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the absolute levels of contributions in each of the four 
treatments. We observe that in all treatments most subjects contribute their full endowment 
(i.e. 10 tokens) to the public good. Specifically, the percentage of full contributors is equal to 
28% (14/50 subjects) in the “All Males” treatment, 32.76% (19/58 subjects) in the “All 
Females” treatment, 41.67% (20/48 subjects) in the “Two Males – One Female” treatment 
and 37.50% (18/48 subjects) in the “Two Females – One Male” treatment. In contrast, it is 
also common across all four treatments that complete free-riding (i.e. contributing zero 
tokens) occurs quite rarely. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test reveals insignificant 
differences in the distributions of contributions among mood treatments (p = 0.326).
3
 
  
                                                          
3
 All p-values reported here refer to two-sided tests unless otherwise stated. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of contributions across treatments 
 
 
 The average contributions are reported in Table 3. Overall, we observe similar 
contribution levels across treatments. In particular, average contributions range from 6 tokens 
(in the “All Males” treatment) to 7.19 tokens (“Two Females – One Male” treatment). When 
we perform non-parametric Wilcoxon tests, we find that contributions are not statistically 
significant different from each other for any pairwise comparison among treatments (p > 
0.122). This finding indicates that average contributions are similar across treatments, 
irrespective of the contributor’s and the third-party punisher’s gender. 
 
Table 3. Average contributions across treatments 
Treatments No. of subjects Mean Std. Dev. 
All Males 50 6.00 3.40 
All Females 58 6.40 3.11 
Two Females – One Male 48 7.19 2.90 
Two Males – One Female 48 7.02 2.98 
 
 
Our first result is summarised below. 
 
RESULT 1: In the presence of third party punishment opportunities, average contribution 
behaviour is not sensitive to gender effects. 
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 However, our main concern is with third party punishment behaviour, as this is our 
vehicle to answer our initial research question. In the next section, we explore whether 
subjects treat free-riding behaviour differently by punishing differently (for given 
contribution behaviour) across our treatments. 
 
3.2 Third-party punishment behaviour 
We start our analysis by examining subjects’ third-party punishment behaviour for each 
treatment. Figure 2 shows the distribution of third-party punishment as measured by the 
number of negative points assigned by the third party to each of the other two group 
members. In all treatments, the majority of third-party punishers assign no punishment at all. 
Across all treatments, the average percentage of punishment assigned is equal to 25.49%. 
When punishment is assigned, it typically ranges from 1 to 5 negative points (with the only 
exception being the “All Females” treatment in which we observe that subjects assign more 
than 5 negative points but only in very few occasions (that is, 2 out of 58 punishment 
decisions)). Our observation that subjects are willing to assigned third-party punishment is 
consonant with existing results from previous studies which also document the presence of 
altruistic punishment in their experiments (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 
 In terms of average punishment assigned by the third parties to the contributors, we 
find that the highest number of negative points are assigned in the “Two Females – One 
Male” treatment (0.71 points), whereas, the lowest number of negative points are assigned in 
the “Two Males – One Female” treatment (0.29 points). For the “All Males” and the “All 
Females” treatments, the average negative points assigned by the third party punisher are 
equal to 0.52 and 0.67, respectively. By performing a non-parametric Wilcoxon test, we find 
insignificant differences in how third party punishment is assigned in all pairwise 
comparisons (p > 0.228) except for the comparison between the “Two Females – One Male” 
and the “Two Males – One Female” treatments (p = 0.097). This implies that third-party 
males punish harsher females contributors compared to how third-party females punish males 
contributors. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of third-party punishment across treatments 
 
 
 We next test more formally, using parametric regression analyses, for the presence of 
differences among our treatments. This analysis allows us to control for important features 
which may affect the assignment of third-party punishment. We report the results from two 
regression models in Table 4. In both models, the dependent variable is the number of 
punishment points the third party assigns to the contributors. As a result, we perform Tobit 
regressions since our dependent variable exhibits censoring at 0 and 10 points. The 
independent variables include three dummy variables which correspond to the “All Males”, 
“All Females” and “Two Females – One Male” treatments. The “Two Males – One Female” 
treatment represents the baseline category in both regression models. In Model (1), we test 
for treatment differences when we control for contribution levels (as captured by the variable 
“Contribution” which indicates the number of tokens contributed by a subject). Model (2) 
includes two further independent variables which relate to how many tokens the third-party 
punishers expect the contributors to contribute. Specifically, the variable called “absolute 
negative contribution deviation from third-party punisher’s beliefs” is the absolute value of 
the actual deviation of a contributor’s decision from the third-party punishers’ belief about 
others’ contribution, when the third-party punisher expectations are below the contributor’s 
decision; and zero otherwise. The variable “positive contribution deviation from third-party 
punisher’s beliefs” is constructed in an analogous way. The regression results are given in 
Table 4. 
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 Table 4 reveals our second main finding. In both regression models, we document that 
the coefficient of the “Two Females – One Male” treatment is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that third-party male punishers sanction female contributors 
significantly harsher than third-party female punishers sanction male contributors, ceteris 
paribus. Interestingly, we observe that, in Model (2), the coefficients of the “absolute 
negative contribution deviation from third-party punisher’s beliefs” and “positive 
contribution deviation from third-party punisher’s beliefs” variables are negative and 
positive, respectively, albeit statistically insignificant.
4
 
 
Table 4. Assignment of third party punishment across treatments – Regression results 
 Dependent variable: Punishment assigned 
by the third party to contributors 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Contribution -0.380 
(0.091) 
          -0.158 
          (0.128) 
Absolute negative contribution deviation from 
third-party punisher’s beliefs 
   -0.247 
(0.177) 
Positive contribution deviation from third-
party punisher’s beliefs 
    0.212 
(0.159) 
All Males 0.307 
(0.861) 
0.407 
(0.861) 
All Females 0.996 
(0.914) 
1.171 
(0.936) 
Two Females – One Male 1.613* 
(0.867) 
  1.939** 
         (0.907) 
Constant -0.520 
(0.997) 
         -1.832 
        (1.364) 
Obs. 204 204 
Notes: Tobit estimates. The variable “Contribution” is variable which indicates the number of tokens 
contributed by a contributor. The variable “Absolute negative contribution deviation from third-party 
punisher’s beliefs” is the absolute value of the actual deviation of a contributor’s decision from the third-party 
punishers’ belief about others’ contribution, when the third-party punisher expectations are below the 
contributor’s decision; and zero otherwise. The variable “positive contribution deviation from third-party 
punisher’s beliefs” is constructed in an analogous way. The variable “All Males” is a dummy variable which 
takes on the value “1” for the “All Males” treatment and “0” otherwise. The variable “All Females” is a 
dummy variable which takes on the value “1” for the “All Females” treatment and “0” otherwise. The variable 
“Two Females – One Male” is a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” for the “Two Females – One 
Male” treatment and “0” otherwise. The “Two Males – One Female” treatment is the baseline category. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
Our second result is summarised below. 
                                                          
4
 The interpretation of these coefficients means that when the actual contribution decision is lower (higher) than 
the third-party punishers’ expectations about others’ contribution, then third-party punishment is harsher (less 
harsh). 
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RESULT 2: The assignment of third-party punishment is sensitive to gender effects, ceteris 
paribus: subjects in the “Two Females – One Male” treatment punish significantly harsher 
than those in the “Two Males – One Female” treatment. 
 
3.3 Earnings 
Our findings from the previous analysis indicate significant differences in how punishment is 
assigned across treatments. A well-established experimental literature has documented that, 
in the short-run or even in one-shot interactions, the assignment of punishment has 
detrimental effects on subjects’ welfare as measured by their net earnings (e.g., Gӓchter et al., 
2008; Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016). In this section, we test whether the average earnings 
of third-party punishers differ among our treatments. To do this, we perform two OLS 
regressions, in which the dependent variable is the final net earnings that a third-party 
punisher receives. The independent variables are the four treatment dummy variables. The 
baseline category is the “Two Males – One Female” treatment. The regression results are 
given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Earnings – Regression results 
 Dependent variable: Final net earnings 
for third-party punisher 
All Males -0.457 
(0.461) 
All Females -0.761 
(0.620) 
Two Females – One Male -0.833* 
(0.469) 
Constant 19.417*** 
(0.240) 
Obs. 102 
Notes: OLS estimates. The variable “All Males” is a dummy variable which takes on the value “1” for the “All 
Males” treatment and “0” otherwise. The variable “All Females” is a dummy variable which takes on the value 
“1” for the “All Females” treatment and “0” otherwise. The variable “Two Females – One Male” is a dummy 
variable which takes on the value “1” for the “Two Females – One Male” treatment and “0” otherwise. The 
“Two Males – One Female” treatment is the baseline category. Robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and 
*** at the 1-percent level. 
 
 The regression results from Table 5 indicate that subjects in the “Two Females – One 
Male” treatment earn significantly less than those in the “Two Males – One Female” 
treatment. Taken together, our findings show that the harsher sanctioning assigned by third-
13 
 
party male punishers to females is detrimental and reduces efficiency at least in the very short 
run. 
 
Our third result is summarised below. 
 
RESULT 3: Average earnings are sensitive to gender effects, ceteris paribus: third-party 
punishers in the “Two Females – One Male” treatment earn significantly less than those in 
the “Two Males – One Female” treatment. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper presents an experimental investigation of the impact of gender on shaping 
altruistic punishment in relation to issues of human cooperation. Our framework is a social 
dilemma game with third-party punishment game, which has played a key role in the social 
preferences literature. This set-up encompasses a broad range of real-world contexts and 
situations that epitomise the conflict of interests between personal interests and collective 
goals. Its study is therefore of great importance as it enables us to understand the proximate 
sources behind human cooperation. Our interest is to assess whether altruistic punishment as 
measured by observing third-party punishers’ decisions is sensitive to gender effects. To 
address our research questions, we included treatments in which the gender of the contributor 
and the third-party punishers is either the same or different. Motivated by naturally-occurring 
situations such as monitoring of teamwork in the workplace, subjects in our experiment are 
informed of each other’s gender within their group. Our main findings show that the 
assignment of third-party punishment is susceptible to gender effects and this has significant 
implications on third-party punishers’ welfare. In groups where the gender of the contributors 
and that of the third punishers is the same, we find no evidence that third-party punishment is 
assigned significantly different. By contrast, we document significant differences when the 
gender of the contributors is different from the third-party punishers’ gender. Specifically, 
third-party male punishers sanction female contributors significantly harsher than third-party 
female punishers do for male contributors, ceteris paribus. As a result, the assignment of 
harsher punishment by male third-parties has detrimental effects on their welfare as measured 
by their net earnings. 
 We contribute to the literature in at least three important ways. First, from a 
theoretical perspective, we show that measures of social preferences such as strong 
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reciprocity are sensitive to gender effects. Our findings, hence, provide further evidence for 
inspiring theory development that can account for gender effects. 
 Second, from an empirical perspective, there is already a growing empirical literature 
identifying that aspects of pro-sociality such as altruistic and cooperative behaviour (e.g., 
Bolton and Katok, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Balliet 
et al., 2011) depend on subjects’ gender. Most of the literature focuses on a narrow band of 
games such as dictator and social dilemma games and even in these settings, the evidence on 
whether and if so how, negative reciprocity is influenced by gender is scarce. This calls for 
the need of more systematic investigations which analyse the issue of gender sensitivity in a 
broader set of games. Our paper extends the existing literature by providing new evidence 
showing that measures of strong negative reciprocity (such as monetary third-party 
punishment) are affected by gender effects in that third-party male punishers negatively 
reciprocate in a harsher way towards female contributors compared to the corresponding 
behaviour of third-party female punishers to male contributors. 
 Third, our results have implications pertaining to the group composition and the role 
assignment in a teamwork environment. Our finding that third-party male monitors earn 
significantly less when matched with female contributors as opposed to third-party female 
monitors when matched with male contributors is due to over-use of punishment by male 
punishers compared to female ones. This suggests that, in mixed gender teams, placing males 
in positions of monitoring authority when it comes to norm enforcement may make them 
exercise a high degree of negative reciprocity towards females, which also has negative 
welfare consequences for the punishers (as measured by their average net earnings). 
 Our study gives rise to a number of different future research avenues. The role of 
gender needs to receive more attention in economic analysis as their effects remain to be a 
challenge to behavioural decision-making theories. In particular, more empirical evidence is 
necessary to better understand the channels through which gender effects influence 
behaviour. Our observation that third-party male punishers sanction female contributors 
harsher than third-party females do for male contributors (for given contribution levels) could 
be due to different expectations that third-party punishers form before they decide on how 
much punishment to assign. In our study, we collect non-incentivised data on beliefs of third 
party punishers about others’ contributions. Preliminary analysis of these data suggests that 
third-party punishers’ beliefs about others’ contributions are weakly different in that third-
party male punishers expect that female will contribute less compared to the expectations that 
third-party female punishers have for their male contributors. This suggests that third-party 
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punishers’ beliefs about others’ contributions may play an important role in their decision 
about how much punishment to assign. However, it is important to note that our belief 
elicitation is not incentivised, and we thus believe that further systematic investigations by 
economists are warranted in order to shed more empirical light on the channels through 
which gender effects influence behaviour in such contexts. 
 Finally, we focus on the effects of gender in a one-shot interaction game. Yet, the 
persistence of this effect is of great relevance, especially in the light of our evidence that the 
welfare of the third-party punishers is sensitive to the specific gender of the punisher and the 
contributors. Therefore, the long-run impact of gender disparities on economic behaviour is 
important to be quantified as it will improve our understanding of the survival and success of 
human societies. 
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Appendix – Experimental Instructions 
[Note: These are the written instructions as presented to subjects facing the “All Females” 
treatment. Regarding the three remaining treatments, corresponding amendments were 
made.] 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is 
run by the “Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory” and has been financed by 
various research foundations. Just for showing up you have already earned £2.50. You can 
earn additional money depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is 
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will 
not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these rules. 
 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will 
have time to ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in 
this experiment are entirely anonymous. Please do not touch the computer or its mouse until 
you are instructed to do so. Thank you. 
 
In the instructions, unless otherwise stated, we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in terms 
of Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). Your entire earnings will, thus, be calculated in 
ECUs. At the end of the session the total amount of ECUs you have earned will be converted 
to Pounds at the following rate: 1 ECU = £0.40. The converted amount will privately be paid 
to you in cash. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be matched with two other people, randomly 
selected from the participants in this room, to form a group of three. Each person in the group 
will be assigned a role, either ‘Participant A’, ‘Participant B’ or ‘Participant C’. All 
participants in your group will be females. You will not learn the identity of the other 
participants in your group. Participants will be identified simply as ‘Participant A’, 
‘Participant B’ or ‘Participant C’. When we have finished reading the instructions you will be 
informed of your role.  
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Detailed Information about the Experiment 
 
The experiment consists of two stages as described below. 
 
Stage 1 
At the beginning of the experiment Participant A and Participant B each will be given 10 
tokens. Participant A and Participant B must choose how many of these tokens to invest in a 
group project and how many to keep in their private accounts. They do so independently of 
each other and without any communication. So at the moment they make their own choice, 
they do not know the choice of the other participant. Participant C does not make any choice 
during Stage 1 and is not affected by the choices made by Participant A and Participant B. 
 
Each token a participant keeps in her private account yields a return of one ECU to that 
participant.  
 
Each token a participant invests in the group project yields a return of 1.5 ECUs to the group. 
This amount will be divided equally among both Participants A and B. Thus every Participant 
(A and B) receives 0.75 ECUs. 
 
Hence, if you are Participant A or B, your earnings in ECUs will be: 
 
(Number of tokens kept in your private account) + 0.75*(Total number of tokens 
invested in the group project by Participant A and B) 
 
If you are one of Participants A or B, you will make your decision by entering the number of 
tokens you invest in the group project. Any tokens you do not invest will automatically be 
kept in your private account. 
 
You will enter your decisions on a screen like the one shown below. 
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On the top of the screen, there is a message informing you of which role (Participant A or B) 
you have been assigned (in this example, Participant A). You have to decide how many 
tokens you want to invest in the group project by typing a number between 0 and 10 in the 
input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. After entering the amount 
of tokens you want to invest you must press the OK button using the mouse. Once you have 
done this, your decision can no longer be revised. 
 
Stage 2 
During Stage 2, Participant A and Participant B will not make any choice. Participant C can 
decrease or leave unchanged the income of each of the other two participants (A and B) by 
assigning negative points to them. 
 
If you are Participant C, you will see the following input screen for Stage 2. 
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Participant C will be informed of the number of tokens each of the other two participants (A 
and B) has invested in the group project as well as their corresponding incomes from Stage 1. 
Participant C will be endowed with 20 points (which correspond to 20 ECUs) and has to 
decide how many negative points to assign to each of them. She can assign between 0 and 10 
negative points to each other two participants (A and B). That is, Participant C can assign up 
to 10 negative points to Participant A and up to 10 negative points to Participant B. 
 
If Participant C does not wish to change the income of the other two participants, then she 
should enter 0 in the corresponding box. If Participant C wishes to decrease another 
participant’s income, she should enter instead the number of negative points that she wishes 
to assign to each of them, preceded by a minus sign (without spaces between them). The 
leading minus sign “–” is required. For example, to assign 5 negative points to another 
participant, type –5 in the relevant box. 
 
Assigning negative points is costly. Each point that Participant C assigns costs her one 
ECU. Thus, the total cost in ECUs of assigning points to the other two participants (A and B) 
is given by the total number of points assigned to each participant. The impact of assigning 
points to other participants is as follows:  If Participant C assigns 0 points to another 
participant, she will not have any effect on the other participants’ income. However, for each 
negative point that Participant C assigns to another participant, she will decrease their income 
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by 3 ECUs (unless their income is already exhausted). For example, if Participant C assigns 5 
negative points to another participant, she will decrease their income by 15 ECUs. And so on. 
 
Therefore, the total income of each participant at the end of Stage 2 is calculated as follows: 
 
 Participant A’s total income (in ECUs) = Income from Stage 1 – 3*(points assigned 
to Participant A by Participant C) 
 
 Participant B’s total income (in ECUs) = Income from Stage 1 – 3*(points assigned 
to Participant B by Participant C) 
 
 Participant C’s total income (in ECUs) = 20 ECUs – (sum of points assigned to 
Participant A and Participant B) 
 
At the end of Stage 2, you will be informed of the choices made by each participant in your 
group and the resulting payoffs. You will be paid £0.40 for every ECU, in addition to your 
£2.50 show-up fee. You will be paid in private and in cash. 
 
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your 
desk. Please do not ask any question out loud. 
 
To ensure everybody understands, each of you will need to answer a few control questions, 
which you can find in the next page. 
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Control Questionnaire 
Please complete the questions below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk 
to check your answers. Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the 
experiment will start. (The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for 
illustrative purposes. In the experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual 
choices of the participants.). 
1. How many participants are there in a group?     _________ 
 
 
2. Suppose that Participant A and Participant B each invests 0 tokens in the group project. 
What is: 
 
Participant A’s income from Stage 1 (in ECUs)?     _________ 
  
Participant B’s income from Stage 1 (in ECUs)?     _________ 
  
 
3. Suppose that Participant A and Participant B each invests 10 tokens in the group project. 
What is: 
 
Participant A’s income from Stage 1 (in ECUs)?     _________ 
  
Participant B’s income from Stage 1 (in ECUs)?     _________ 
 
4. Suppose that Participant A and Participant B each invests 5 tokens in the group project. 
What is: 
 
Participant A’s income from Stage 1 (in ECUs)?     _________ 
  
Participant B’s income from Stage 1 (in ECUs)?     _________ 
 
 
5. Suppose that Participant C assigns 2 negative points to each of the other two participants 
(A and B). What is the impact of the negative points assigned to each of them?  _________ 
 
 
6. By how many ECUs will Participant C’s income be changed if she assigns 5 negative 
points to each of the other two participants?       _________ 
 
 
7. What is the gender of the participants in a group?     _________ 
 
 
